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Publications

Books

The Indispensability of Intuitions (Cambridge Elements in Epistemology), under contract, New York: Cambridge University Press

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Know How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. 2012. Co-edited with John Bengson. New York: Oxford University Press     <OUP site>

Articles

Action-theoretic foundations for epistemology. forthcoming (2023). Southwest Philosophical Studies, 45 (Glenn Joy Award). <pdf>

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Intuitions as evidence: An introduction. 2023. In Lasonen-Aarnio & Littlejohn (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence   <pdf>

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Review of Norms and Necessity by Amie L. Thomasson. 2023. Notre Dame Philosophical Review   <link>

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Non propositional intellectualism. 2012. In Bengson & Moffett (Eds.), Know How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action. (w/John Bengson)   <pdf>

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Introduction: Two conceptions of mind and action. 2012. In Bengson & Moffett (Eds.), Know How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action. (w/John Bengson)   <pdf>

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Against a posteriori functionalism. 2010. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40: 83-106   <pdf>

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The folk on knowing how. 2009. Philosophical Studies, 142: 387-401. (w/John Bengson and Jennifer Wright)    <pdf>

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Reasonable disagreement and rational group inquiry. 2007. Episteme, 4: 352-367.   <pdf>

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Know-how and concept possession. 2007. Philosophical Studies, 136: 31-57. (w/John Bengson)     <pdf>

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Constructing attitudes. 2005. Protosociology, 21: 105-128.    <pdf>

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Knowing facts and believing propositions: A solution to the problem of doxastic shift. 2003. Philosophical Studies, 115: 81-97 <pdf>

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Language, communication, and the paradox of analysis: Some philosophical remarks on Plato's Cratylus. 2003. Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy, 8: 58-67    <pdf>

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A note on the relationship between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle. 2002. Journal of Semantics, 19: 159-166.    <pdf>

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Works-in-Progress

Act-centered epistemic conservatism. <pdf>​

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